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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical analysis of individual earnings using data
from the Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos. We find that the predictable
component of income is hump-shaped over the life-cycle, and that there are
strong education effects. The unpredictable component of income can be
described by a very persistent permanent shock and a transitory shock. Our
estimates are built from a panel of cohorts, so we use US data from the PSID
to provide a magnitude for the underestimation of the estimated variances.
Surprisingly, we find that the variance of the permanent shock is almost 4
times smaller in Chile than in the US, a result, perhaps, of the relative rigidity
of the Chilean labor market.
JEL classification: D12 (Consumer economics: empirical analysis), D89 (Information
and uncertainty), H54 (National government expenditures and welfare programs).
                                                          
1 Prepared for the 2003 Central Bank of Chile Annual Conference. We thank Paulina Granados and the Central Bank
of Chile for access to the ESI database, and Guiseppe Bertola, Olivier Blanchard, David Bravo, Eduardo Engel, Juan
Jimeno, Norman Loayza, Rodrigo Valdés, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, and the editors for useful comments and
suggestions. Repetto acknowledges financial support from an institutional grant to CEA from the Hewlett Foundation.
Contact information: chuneeus@stanford.edu and arepetto@dii.uchile.cl.Introduction
Uncertainty is a key dimension of individual decision making. Under incomplete markets there are
contingencies for which individuals cannot insure. Uncertainty thus influences the life-cycle
evolution of consumption and savings, labor supply and asset allocation, and education and
occupation choices. Uncertainty and risk also determine income and consumption inequality. Ex-
ante identical individuals will have different lifetime paths of consumption ex-post, as some
individuals are lucky and get good draws of income, employment and health, whereas others get
bad shocks and end up with lower levels of consumption over the life-cycle. Income mobility and
the persistence of income inequality and poverty depend upon the dynamics of earnings, health
outcomes, investment opportunities, and more generally, earnings capacity.
In this paper we measure the earnings uncertainty faced by individuals. Most of the existing
empirical literature focuses on the dynamics of income and wages using data from developed
countries (Abowd and Card, 1989; Pischke, 1995; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2003). Our data draw
from a survey of Chilean households -- the Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos (ESI) carried  out
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE). Whether consumers in an emerging economy face
levels of uncertainty similar to those in developed economies is an empirical matter that is
addressed in this paper. However, the welfare consequences of uncertainty may be much larger. On
the one hand, individuals have fewer opportunities to share risks through the marketplace when
markets are less developed. On the other hand, the public welfare system is much smaller in
developing countries, providing fewer opportunities to offset negative shocks.
Our modelling structure allows us to distinguish between a predictable and an unpredictable
component of income. Furthermore, we decompose the unpredictable part into permanent and
transitory shocks to income. Specifically, we model the unexplained portion of individual earnings
as the sum of a permanent and a (persistent) transitory disturbance. We also allow for time varying
variances of permanent and transitory perturbances, and evaluate whether they correlate with the
business cycle. Since the ESI dataset is a repeated cross-section, we construct synthetic panels to
perform our estimations. Our synthetic panels contain annual observations from 1990-2000, on 5-
year birth cohorts.
Using data on men between the ages of 25 and 60, our results indicate that the age profile of labor
income has the typical hump-shape, and that there are very large educational effects. At age 50, a
college educated individual expects to earn 2.5 times the earnings of a person who attained up to
high school, and 3.8 times the earnings of an individual who only completed 8 years of schooling.
We also find that married men earn more than their single and divorced counterparts, and that
household size has a negative impact on earnings.
Our decomposition of the unexplained portion of income yields very persistent but low variance
permanent shocks, and a neglegible variance of the transitory shock. These low variances may be
an artifact of our synthetic panel technique, as averaging reduces the observed variability. We
investigate this hypothesis by comparing our results to those obtained using US data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics. We find that if we replicate our cohort estimation procedure with US
data, we find a similar process for the dynamics of income. However, we find a significantly higher
variance of earnings in the US than in Chile. We interpret this as evidence of the relative rigidity ofthe Chilean labor market (vis a vis the US labor market). We also find that averaging within cohorts
reduces the estimated variance by one order of magnitude. Extrapolating the US results to Chilean
data, we find that the variance of the permanent shock at the individual level is about 0.021. We
cannot provide an estimate of the variance of the transitory shock, as our benchmark estimates all
turn out non significant.
If markets are complete, individuals can perfectly share their good and bad fortunes. If so, then the
measurement of individual uncertainty becomes irrelevant. However, there exists vast evidence
showing that in practice many important events are not insured and that markets do not fully pool
risks (Attanasio and Davis (1996), Dynarski and Gruber (1996)). A number of mechanisms help
individuals insulate their consumption from income shocks (changes in their labor supply, spousal
income, public and private transfers, and through the progressivity of the income tax). In this paper
we ask whether government transfers allow consumers to partly offset persistent shifts in earnings
capacity. To answer this question we reestimate our basic model using labor income plus the
receipts from public welfare programs as our measure of individual earnings. We find that the
inclusion of government transfers hardly affects the estimated process of income, although there is
a negative effect of earned income on the likelihood that any given individual receives a transfer.
The paper also provides a number of applications. Specifically, we analyze income inequality and
earnings mobility simulating the life-cycle income profiles of an individual that faces the process
we have estimated. Since income is estimated to be highly persistent, our simulations show that we
should expect to observe little mobility of individuals across the distribution of income. In
particular, our results show that an individual who starts-off at the lowest quintile of the earnings
distribution will stay in that same quintile for a year with a 0.77-0.84 chance. Furthermore, the
likelihood that the same individual will be again in the lowest quintile ten years ahead ranges
between 0.40 and 0.58. A similar pattern is found at the top of the distribution. That is, we find that
the Chilean distribution of income is highly persistent because the underlying earnings process is
also highly persistent.  Finally, we find that a large portion of income inequality can be explained
by the underlying variability of the earnings process.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data and compare the ESI to
the CASEN, the Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional the most widely used
survey for the analysis of Chilean household behavior. In Section 3 we present the model and
estimation techniques. In Section 4 we start by providing our estimates of mean income, to then use
the unexplained portion of income to fit different dynamic processes. We also compare the results
on Chile to a similar sample of American workers. In Section 5 we provide a number of
applications of our results. We conclude in Section 6.
Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos, ESI. The ESI
is a supplement to the National Employment Survey conducted monthly by the INE. The main goal
of the ESI is to provide information on individual and household income. The ESI collects
information over the last quarter of every year on a sample of roughly 36,000 households. These
households are representative of the Chilean population. The survey gathers information on allhousehold members that are at least 15 years old. Data on all types of income perceived during the
previous month, and a number of individual characteristics such as educational attainment, marital
status, gender and employment status is registered. Population weights are also provided. Data is
available for years 1990-2000, except for year 1994 when the survey was not conducted. The use of
the ESI as a source of income data has been fairly limited. An exception is Granados (2001).
Our analysis considers men between ages 25 and 60 who are not self-employed. We deflate all
nominal variables using the CPI of the corresponding month of the interview. Real variables are
reported in December 1999 Chilean pesos. Table 1 reports the sample's basic statistics. On average,
individuals in our sample earn almost 170 thousand pesos each month. The median is just above
100 thousand pesos, reflecting the skewness of the Chilean income distribution. About 17% of
individuals report income below the monthly minimum wage. The typical individual in the sample
is 38 years old, married, and has completed 9 years of education (corresponding to an education
level of just over secondary school). Finally, the median household has 4 residents, and most
individuals live in the V, VIII, and Metropolitan administrative regions.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of personal labor income. The distribution shows the extent of
income inequality in Chile, which has been extensively analyzed elsewhere. The figure also shows
the distribution of income in the 1996 CASEN taken from Baytelman et al (1999).
2 These two
distributions are not directly comparable, as the CASEN figures include transfers and represent
different sample years.
3 Furthermore, the ESI distribution is built from our data set on men.
However, the graph shows that the distributions are quite alike, especially for the middle deciles.
Most of the differences are concentrated at the bottom and top of the distribution. As a matter of
fact, the ratio of the income share of the 20% individuals with highest income to the share of the
bottom 20% is 7.9 in the ESI. This same ratio is equal to 13.8 in the CASEN. Similarly, the ratio of
the share of the highest decile to the share of the lowest decile is equal to 13.2 in the ESI and 29.5
in the CASEN.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the mean of (the log of) real earnings over the sample period. On
average, real earnings grew at an annual rate of 4.7% in the period 1990-2000.
4 The line labelled
“Primary” plots the evolution of average income for individuals who have attained 8 years of
schooling; the line labelled “High” shows the evolution of individuals who have completed 12
years of education; finally, the line labelled “College” takes individuals who have completed 17
years of education.
5  In all cases the path of mean earnings is upwardly trended, although the
                                                          
2 The CASEN is the most widely used survey for the analysis of Chilean household and individual income and
earnings. The survey begun in 1985, and it has been carried almost every two years since then. The CASEN measures
household and individual income for a representative sample of the Chilean population, and it has been mainly used to
study income inequality and the role of social policies in reducing it (Anríquez et al, 1998; Larrañaga, 1994; Contreras
et al, 2001). The CASEN had a sample size of 48107 households in year 1998. Like the ESI, the survey gathers
information on all types of income, and on a number of demographic characteristics. Futhermore, it collects
information on in-kind transfers, such as public programs in education, housing and health, and housing and durables
ownership, allowing for detailed studies of poverty. We are precluded from the use of the CASEN because of its two-
year frequency. As we show below, the dynamics of earnings is highly persistent, and thus the CASEN misses most of
the action in the two year lag.
3 Nevertheless, the distribution of income has hardly changed over the last decade. See Baytelman et al (1999).
4 GDP per capita grew at about 5% over this period.
5 Universities in Chile grant simultaneously a college degree and a professional title. Most programs last about 5 years.annual rates of growth correlate positively with educational attainment. Thus, as other countries,
Chile has experienced a widening of the earnings distribution.
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Figure 3 plots the evolution of the variance of log earnings over the sample period, for all
individuals and for three different education groups. Highly educated workers face a much larger
variance of earnings; i.e. there are large private returns on university education at the cost of
increased earnings risk. The variance of the earnings of low education groups is quite stable over
the period. This stability contrasts with the behavior of the earnings variance of those who have
attained college education, which experienced large swings over the ten year span.
In the next subsections we use the ESI dataset to estimate mean income profiles over the life-cycle
for the typical Chilean individual. We then use the unexplained portion of income to estimate the
dynamic process of earnings. The use of the ESI survey has a major shortcoming: the analysis of
income dynamics requires following the same individuals over time. Since both surveys represent
cross-sections of households, we build synthetic panels based on 5-year birth cohorts. Table 2
presents the number of observations available for each cohort and year.
The Earnings Model
In this paper we consider models in which all individuals within an educational category have
identical income processes, but face different realizations of this process.
7 Income consists of the
sum of a predictable component and a stochastic component. Let yi,t represent the logarithm of
individual's i real measured income in year t. Let Zi,t represent a vector of demographic
characteristics, and ηi,t the stochastic component of income. We assume that the unexplained
component can be decomposed into a permanent shock y
p
i,t -- e.g. health shocks that affect earnings
capacity in a long lasting way and long-term unemployment -- and a transitory innovation µi,t -- e.g.
bonuses and overtime pay. We also allow for classical measurement error, ωi,t. Finally, we assume
that y
p and µ are uncorrelated at all leads and lags. We thus propose the following model for
individual income
yi,t = Zi,tβ + ηi,t
yi,t = Zi,tβ + y
p
i,t + µi,t + ωi,t
We allow for different assumptions on the process that both the permanent and transitory
innovation follow. For instance, in the benchmark case we assume that the permanent component is






                                                          
6 For US evidence, see Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Murphy and Welch (1992); for
Chilean evidence, see Bravo and Marinovic (1997), and Beyer and Le Foulon (2001).
7 Recent literature has modelled earnings processes allowing for heterogeneity between agents. See Alvarez, Browning
and Ejrnæs (2001).µi,t = εi,t − θ εi,t-1
We allow for persistence in transitory shocks to account for innovations, such as overtime pay and
bonuses, that may last for a while but do not have long lasting effects.
Alternatively, we explore a model where permanent shocks follow an AR(1) process whereas the






with 0 < ρ < 1, and
µi,t = εi,t
We estimate our complete model in two stages. In the first stage we use individual level data to
estimate β and to compute η ˆ= y-Zβ ˆfor each observation in our sample. In the second stage we
classify all observations on the basis of their year of birth, and take averages of η ˆ building a













where the superscript c indexes birth-year cohorts, and n
c
t represents the number of available
observations in cohort c in year t. We use this synthetic panel to estimate the variances of the
permanent and transitory components of income shocks (συ,t and σε,t, respectively) and the
persistence of the transitory innovation (θ). Our modelling structure allows for time-varying
variances.
9 We estimate these parameters using equally weigthed GMM by minimizing the distance
between the theoretical and the empirical autocovariances of the first difference of the stochastic
component of income.
10
Assume there is no measurement error, and that the dynamics of earnings is characterized by a
random walk plus an MA(1) transitory shock.
11 Then
                                                          
8 We use the survey's population weights to build the means.
9 Nevertheless, in this paper we restrict the variances of the shocks to be constant over time. Given the short span of our
data set, and the fact that 1994 data is unavailable, we were able to estimate the permanent variances for only 4 years
(1992, 1997, 1998, and 1999). Although the estimated variances seem to correlate with the unemployment rate, they are
not tightly identified. Results are available upon request.
10 See Altonji and Segal (1996) for an analysis of alternative weighting procedures.
11 In our procedure we assume that measurement error cancels out when we collapse our individual data set into cohort
means. In what follows we thus ignore measurement error.∆ ηi,t = ηi,t  − ηi,t-1  = υi,t + εi,t − (θ + 1)εi,t-1 + θεi,t-2
The theoretical autocovariances are thus given by
Var(∆ ηi,t ) = συ,t + σε,t + (θ + 1)
2 σε,t-1 + θ
2σε,t-2
Covar(∆ ηi,t, ∆ ηi,t-1) = −(θ + 1)σε,t-1 − θ (θ + 1)σε,t-2
Covar(∆ ηi,t, ∆ ηi,t+1) = −(θ + 1)σε,t − θ (θ + 1)σε,t-1
Covar(∆ ηi,t, ∆ ηi,t-2) = θ σε,t-2
Covar(∆ ηi,t, ∆ ηi,t+2) = θ σε,t
Covar(∆ ηi,t, ∆ ηi,t-j) = 0,  j > 2
Covar(∆ ηi,t, ∆ ηi,t+j) = 0,  j > 2
We follow a similar procedure to estimate the underlying parameters when we assume alternative
dynamic specifications.
The fact that we construct a synthetic panel, and follow cohorts but not individuals over time
implies that our analysis is based on averages. Thus, we expect to underestimate the true
uncertainty level individuals face in Chile. In the analysis below, we provide estimates from a
comparable sample taken from US data (Panel Study of Income Dynamics), to show how much the
estimated process changes once we move from following individuals to following cohorts.
Results
The predictable component of income
We report our first stage estimation results in Table 3. In the regression we control for age,
education, marital status, household size, and for interaction terms and nonlinear effects of these
variables. We also control for the region of residence, and year and month of the interview.
Our results show that the age profile of labor income has the typical hump-shape found for other
countries. We also find very large educational effects. Figure 4 plots the estimated age profiles for
three different educational groups. The line labelled “Primary School” plots the average life cycle
profile of income for individuals who have attained 8 years of schooling; the line labelled “High
School” assumes the individual has completed 12 years of education; finally, the line labelled
“College” assumes 17 years of education. All the other variables have been set at their average
sample levels. To illustrate the magnitude of the education effect, consider three identicalindividuals, except for their level of schooling. At age 25, an individual with 8 years of completed
schooling on average earns about 85000 pesos per month, whereas an individual with 12 years of
education earns almost 120 thousand pesos per month; i.e. a difference of 40%. A college educated
individual earns on average at age 25 about 280000 pesos; that is, 2.3 times the earnings of a high
school educated individual. These differences increase with age. At age 50, a college educated
individual earns 2.5 times the earnings of a person who attained up to high school, and 3.8 times
the earnings of an individual who only completed 8 years of schooling. These differences further
widen up once we realize that education and household size are negatively related, and that
household size has a negative impact on earnings. On the contrary, educated people are less likely
to be married, but this correlation is quite small in the sample.
The dynamics of income
Since we do not follow the same individuals over time, we estimate the process of income using a
synthetic panel approach. For each individual in the sample, we take the unexplained component of
(log) income as η ˆ= y-Zβ ˆ. We then classify all observations according to birth cohort, forming our
synthetic panel. Figure 5 tracks the variance of the unexplained portion of earnings within each
cohort observed from 1990 through to 2000. The variance clearly increases with age, which reflects
the fact that ex-ante identical individuals end up with quite different paths of income. In other
words, in a sample of ex-ante identical agents, income inequality increases over time whenever
there is a permanent component in uncertainty. If all shocks were i.i.d., the distribution of income
would be age independent. Furthermore, individuals do start off at very different levels, as the
initial variance is quite high.
The figure does not show important differences across cohorts. Except for the younger cohorts, the
time path of the variance of earnings for any two consecutive cohorts typically cross, with no clear
pattern. This means that at the same age, individuals born in different years should not expect
different levels if uncertainty. For all cohorts, the variance tends to have a peak around 1996,
indicating the presence of time effects in the cross-sectional variance of income -- perhaps,
aggregate fluctuations that change the dispersion of income.
In Table 4 we display the sample autocovariance matrix of the residual of log income changes. The
upper right triangle shows the covariances; the lower traingle shows the correlations. We find high
autocorrelations at the first order, followed by a steep decline at higher orders. These patterns
suggest that income changes may be modelled as an MA(1) process.
Our benchmark estimates are reported in the top panel of Table 5, where we define income as
annual individual earnings. Three cases are analyzed depending upon whether the permanent
component follows a random walk or an AR(1) stationary process, and whether the transitory shock
is i.i.d. or an MA(1). In all cases the transitory component is not significant at a 5% significance
level. The transitory shock does not show any persistence either. These findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that the transitory component is i.i.d at the individual level, and that this component
becomes neglegible when averaging within cohorts. In other words, the transitory component in
indistinguishable from classical measurement error. The permanent component follows an AR(1)
process, as the autocorrelation coefficient is statistically smaller than 1. The estimated variance ofthe permanent component is much larger than the variance of the transitory shock. However, it is an
order of magnitude smaller than the variance estimated by several authors using a panel of
individual US data from panel sets such as the PSID.
12 This large difference can also be explained
by the fact we track cohorts and not individuals over time.
13 We further investigate this hypothesis
below.
In the second panel of Table 5 we estimate the dynamics of Chilean earnings using labor income
plus government transfers. In this exercise we ask to what extent the government provides
insurance through its monetary transfers. A number of papers have analyzed the role of government
transfers in alleviating poverty and in reducing income inequality in Chile (Baytelman et al (1999)
and Engel et al (1999)). We analyze whether public transfers do reduce the uncertainty faced by
individuals.
The estimated processes with and without transfers are very much alike. This is due to the fact that
very few individuals report having received transfers in our data set.
14 However, a probit regression
of a dummy indicating whether the individual received a positive transfer on the level of real
earnings, and year, month and regional dummies, yields a highly significant negative effect of
perceived income on the probability of receiving a transfer. Hence, in our sample, public transfers
do play a (limited) redistributive role.
15
To further investigate the hypothesis that due to cohort averaging, we largely underestimate the
variances, we study whether our estimation process leads to similar results using data from the US.
Specifically, we compare our results to those obtained from a comparable sample taken from US
data, using a synthetic panel and individual level data. Our source of information is the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a representative longitudinal survey of nearly 8000
households. The PSID started collecting data on individuals and households in 1968, and has
followed the same households and their split-offs on a yearly basis since then. The survey has rich
data on a large number of economic and demographic variables. Below we exploit the fact that the
PSID has a panel structure, which allows us to estimate the dynamics of income using individual
data directly. We then reestimate the process using cohort data to analyze the way estimated
parameters are affected by using a synthetic panel technique. We use the surveys from 1988 to
1997. Table 6 reports some sample descriptive statistics.
Our analysis of the US data replicates the analysis of Chilean data. We first restrict our samples to
men between ages 25 and 60. We deflate wage income by the CPI-U. We then estimate the
predictable component of labor income using the same variables and functional form reported for
Chile in the previous subsection. We then construct a series for the unexplained portion of labor
income for every individual in our sample. We use the sample weights to perform our estimates.
                                                          
12 See Meghir and Pistaferri (2003) for the most recent results.
13 See Pischke (1995) for a comparison of the variability and persistence of aggregate and individual income.
14 Only about 1.5% report a positive level of transfers. This underreporting of transfers might be explained by the fact
that most monetary subsidies are paid through the worker’s paycheck. Thus individuals may incorrectly report transfers
as part of their labor earnings.
15 The marginal effect is -2.08¤ 10
-8 , so every additional 200 thousand pesos of income (about one standard deviation
in the sample) reduce the chance of receiving a public transfer in 0.42 percentage points.Figure 6 plots the behavior over the sample period of the US within-cohort residual variance. As in
the Chilean case, the figures do not reveal the presence of a cohort effect. Two properties are not
shared by the Chilean and American profiles. First, the variance is quite flat over most of the life-
cycle in the US. Second, the variance is much larger in the US than in Chile -- almost 2.05 times
larger on average. This result seems counterintuitive, and it is not an artifact of the different
currency denominations used to measure income.
16, 
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This striking gap in earnings risk may be the result of institutional rigidities that reduce wage
dispersion in the Chilean labor market relative to the American labor market. As shown by Bertola
and Ichino (1995), there is much less wage inequality in markets where workers do move across
firms, occupations, and regions in response to productivity and demand shocks. Thus wage
dispersion differences may be the reflect different labor market institutions, labor reallocation costs,
and wage contract structures.
Alternatively, once we allow for the endogeneity of earnings, a possible explanation is that
American workers are willing to face a much larger level of uncertainty than their Chilean
counterparts, as they have more opportunities to share risks through the marketplace when markets
are more developed. Furthermore, the public welfare system is much larger in the US, and female
labor force participation is much higher. Both provide insurance against negative shocks.
Therefore, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that in the US workers can afford to take
more risks, and choose occupations and jobs that are more risky.
The gap between the variance in Chile and the US is reduced as individuals age. This fact might
also have an institutional explanation:  minimum wage laws might have a larger effect on Chilean
young workers. As a matter of fact, the Chilean real minimum wage rised in 72% over the sample
years, whereas the US real minimum wage rised in only 18%.
In Table 7 we estimate the dynamics of income using the information on American workers,
assuming the process is described by a random walk plus an i.i.d. transitory disturbance. For
comparison, the first panel of the Table repeats the results obtained using the ESI. In the second
panel we present the results using synthetic cohorts from the PSID. Similar to the Chilean case, we
find that the process can be solely described by a random walk, as the transitory shock averages out
in the aggregate. Moreover, we find that the variance of the permanent shock is much larger in the
US than in Chile, confirming the results in Figures 5 and 6. 
18
The last panel of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters using individual level data from the
PSID. We find that the variance of the permanent shock is one order of magnitude larger than the
                                                          
16 Recall that all variables are measured in natural logs. We obtained similar results using the 1990-2000 Current
Population Survey (CPS). The results are available upon request. However, survey methodologies and the extent of
measurement error might partly explain these differences.
17  The US variance of log real earnings is higher than the Chilean variance (before conditioning on worker
characteristics). Furthermore, the R
2 of the regression on Chilean data is much higher, thus a larger portion of total
income variability is explained by the predictable part of earnings. Both facts are consistent with the notion that
Chilean workers face much less income uncertainty than their American counterparts.
18 The qualitative results are similar if we assume an AR(1) plus an i.i.d. shock, or a random walk plus an MA(1) shock.one estimated using cohort data. We also find a significant variance of the transitory shock.
19 Our
results are consistent with other analyses. For instance, Meghir and Pistaferri (2003) use a similar
sample from the PSID, and find that the variance of the permanent shock is 0.0313, whereas the
variance of the transitory shock is between 0.00779 and 0.03.
20
If the information in the PSID exercises can be extrapolated to the Chilean case, we would find that
the variance of the permanent shock is one order of magnitude larger than the one we estimate
using the panel of cohorts, i.e., about 0.0209. It is also likely that the variance of the transitory
shock is different from zero. These results have important behavioral implications. First, if
innovations are permanent and individuals are prudent, then precautionary savings can become
quantitatively very important (Deaton, 1992). Second, the distribution of labor income can be
persistently very unequal. Finally, the position of an individual on the income distribution is also
highly persistent, as good and bad fortunes last forever. Below we provide simulation exercises that
intend to illustrate these points. We first simulate life-cycle paths of income using our estimated
processes. Then we use the simulated outcomes to build income distributions and to estimate the
likelihood that an individual will move along the income distribution.
Application to Earnings mobility
Our application refers to income inequality and earnings persistence over the life cycle. We provide
two sets of exercises that illustrate the effects of shock variance and persistence, using our
benchmark estimates.  In our first set we estimate transition matrices – the conditional probability
that an individual will move along the income distribution – that results from the estimated
persistence of the dynamics of income. In our second set of exercises, we estimate the distribution
of income that results from the estimated variances.
To compute the transition matrices and the income distributions, we first generate 5000 lifetime
income streams based on our estimates. We assume a life-cycle of 35 years (ages 25-60) and set the
parameters of the model equal to the values estimated in Table 5. We assume all individuals are
identical at age 25. Table 8 shows the simulated one-year transition matrices that result from
assuming a random-walk and an AR(1) process with first order autocorrelation coefficient equal to
0.93095. The high persistence of the shocks implies that there is very limited earnings mobility. For
instance, an individual who starts-off at the lowest quintile of the distribution has a 0.77-0.84
chance of staying there for another period. The likelihood of an individual at the richest quintile
staying at that same quintile is quite similar. As expected, mobility is concentrated at the middle of
the distribution. However, the persistence is still quite high at that position of the distribution. Table
9 shows the simulated ten year transition matrices; i.e, the chance that an individual starting-off at
any given quintile will be at the same or at another quintile ten years ahead. Since the processes we
estimate are highly persistent, we find that even over a ten year horizon, mobility is rather limited.
Figures 7 and 8 show the chance that an individual is at any given point in life at the third and
                                                          
19 Since we estimated the processes using a non-linear methodology, we should not expect to find that the cohort level
variance is equal to the individual level variance divided by the number of individuals in the cohort.
20 Meghir and Pistaferri (2003) allow for measurement error, and show that the process for measurement error and for
the transitory shock cannot be identified without external information. They find that the variance of the error in
measurement must be between 0.01 and 0.03, assuming an MA(1) transitory shock. They estimate that the MA(1)
coefficient is bounded between -0.18 and -0.25.lowest quintiles, respectively, under the two alternative levels of persistence.  Thus a major
implication of our results is that poverty and the distribution of income in Chile should be quite
persistent.
The variance level of the income process has important implications for the skewness of the income
distribution. Table 10 shows the share of total income of individuals at different positions of the
income distribution, and at different ages.  The first column reports the simulation results using the
estimated variance. The second column uses the scaled ESI variance to account for the
underestimation implied by our cohort technique.  For instance, the richest 20% individuals at age
30 receive a share of income that is 1.41 times the share of the poorest 20%, assuming our
uncorrected benchmark estimates. This ratio increases to 2.48 if we scale the variance according to
our PSID results.  Because of the persistence of our estimates, simulated inequality increases with
age. Nevertheless, our simulations cannot match actual income disparities. According to the
CASEN, the richest quintile receives a share of about 13.8 times the share of the lowest quintile.
Our underestimation is the result of the assumption that all individuals start off with the same
characteristics. In particular, we assume the same educational attainment across workers. Figure 4
shows that schooling might explain a large portion of income inequality. Still, once we take the
scaled variances, a large portion of actual inequality is explained by the underlying variability of
the process of individual income.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have estimated the dynamic process of individual income using the Encuesta
Suplementaria de Ingresos. We have found a highly persistent, but low variability income process.
We have also shown that the low variance is an artifact of our cohort technique. Using data for
American workers, we have found that averaging over cohorts leads to variance underestimation of
one order of magnitude. Future work should directly address the issue of underestimation, which
requires long panel sets of data on individual income. In Chile there exist rich panel sets that have
followed workers over long periods of time and on a monthly basis. Unfortunately, these data sets
are not publicly available as of today.References
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Econometrica 63(4).Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Monthly Labor Income (Dec.99 pesos) 168534 191520 6 4189475 107729
Age 38.8 9.4 25 60 38
Years of Schooling 9.3 4.2 0 20 9
Household Size 4.6 2.0 1 26 4
Married 0.70 0.46 0 1 1
% of individuals living in
    RM 0.22 0.42 0 1 0
    V Region 0.11 0.31 0 1 0
    VIII Region 0.13 0.34 0 1 0
Source: 1990-2000 ESI.
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics - ESICohort
(age in 1990) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
56-60 808 652 503 323 0 0 0 0 0 0
51-55 1226 1186 1071 979 843 589 451 312 148 0
46-50 1642 1640 1524 1492 1179 1181 1167 983 958 972
41-45 2045 2032 1945 1832 1615 1607 1617 1545 1478 1437
36-40 2471 2370 2346 2215 1994 2274 1881 1782 1697 1860
31-35 3054 2952 2745 2680 2620 2436 2640 2462 2404 2435
26-30 3520 3370 3134 3091 2767 2950 2847 2819 2783 3030
21-25 702 1333 1955 2671 2928 3004 2849 2729 2715 2818
16-20 0 0 0 0 573 1101 1691 2114 2530 2873
Total 15468 15535 15223 15283 14519 15142 15143 14746 14713 15425
Year





Years of schooling -0.024810 0.004483
Years of schooling
2 0.003484 0.000285
Age*Years of schooling 0.000641 0.000062
Years of schooling
4 0.000006 0.000001
Household size -0.009955 0.001391
Married 0.190891 0.010351




Authors' estimation based on the 1990-2000 ESI.
The regressions also include a full set of year dummies, a
full set of month of the interview dummies, and region of residence
dummies. 
Table 3. Mean Income
(Dependent variable: log of monthly labor income)1991 1992 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1991 0.000075 5.40E-06 2.20E-06 -0.000051 -3.10E-06 7.40E-06 0.000053 -0.000029
1992 0.70860 0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00007 -0.00002 0.00004 0.00001 0.00003
(0.0491)
1993 -0.54160 -0.87000 0.00022 -0.00019 -0.00009 0.00027 -0.00011 -0.00006
(0.1656) (0.005)
1996 -0.07240 -0.53340 -0.03530 0.00042 0.00010 -0.00041 0.00011 -0.00001
(0.8774) (0.2175) (0.9402)
1997 0.29510 -0.27810 0.41300 0.32160 0.00017 -0.00019 -0.00004 0.00011
(0.5205) (0.5459) (0.3571) (0.4373)
1998 -0.10130 0.31320 0.23720 -0.86830 -0.55230 0.00050 -0.00014 -0.00003
(0.8289) (0.4939) (0.6086) (0.0052) (0.1558)
1999 0.28160 0.13170 -0.53580 0.21680 -0.34050 -0.33580 0.00019 -0.00015
(0.5406) (0.7784) (0.2152) (0.6061) (0.4091) (0.4162)
2000 -0.19110 0.26450 -0.23820 -0.11660 0.49230 -0.01620 -0.59620 0.00032
(0.7169) (0.6124) (0.6494) (0.8033) (0.2617) (0.9725) (0.1577)
Correlations below the diagonal, covariances above the diagonal. 
Significance in parentheses.
Table 4. Covariance Matrix of Log Income Changes - ESIVariance Autocorrelation Variance MA(1) Coeff.
Without Transfers
Permanent AR(1) 0.00395 0.93095 -0.00028
Transitory i.i.d. (0.00062) (0.02830) (0.00028)
Permanent random walk 0.00326 0.00014 0.15868
Transitory MA(1) (0.00080) (0.00067) (2.64100)
Permanent random walk 0.003028 0.000303
Transitory i.i.d. (0.00067) (0.000264)
With Transfers Permanent AR(1) 0.00394 0.93077 -0.00026
Transitory i.i.d. (0.00062) (0.02900) (0.00028)
Permanent random walk 0.00327 0.00014 0.15871
Transitory MA(1) (0.00081) (0.00068) (2.6169)
Permanent random walk 0.00304 0.00031
Transitory i.i.d. (0.00069) (0.00027)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Permanent Component Transitory Component
Table 5. The Dynamic Process of Labor Income - ESIMean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Annual Labor Income (96 dollars) 39714 40119 1076 1274859 32617
Age 39.3 8.5 25 60 38
Years of Schooling 13.1 2.8 0 21 12
Household Size 3.2 1.5 1 13 3
Married 0.79 0.40 0 1 1
Source: 1988-1997 PSID.
Table 6. Sample Descriptive Statistics - PSIDPermanent Transitory
Variance Variance
ESI - Cohorts 0.00303 0.00030
(0.00067) (0.00026)
PSID - Cohorts 0.01181 0.00080
(0.00362) (0.00157)
PSID - Individuals 0.08150 0.11173
(0.00839) (0.00644)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7. The Dynamic Process of Labor Income
Chile and the USQuintile in t 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.84 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00
2 0.14 0.65 0.19 0.02 0.00
3 0.01 0.19 0.60 0.18 0.01
4 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.65 0.15
5 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.84
Quintile in t 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.77 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.00
2 0.20 0.50 0.25 0.05 0.00
3 0.03 0.25 0.45 0.25 0.03
4 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.50 0.20
5 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.76
Table 8. Simulated Income Mobility
a. One Year Transition Matrix - ESI - Random Walk
b. One Year Transition Matrix - ESI - AR(1)
Quintile in t+1
Quintile in t+1Quintile in t 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.58 0.25 0.11 0.05 0.02
2 0.25 0.32 0.24 0.13 0.05
3 0.11 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.11
4 0.04 0.14 0.24 0.32 0.26
5 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.56
Quintile in t 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.40 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.06
2 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.12
3 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18
4 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.25
5 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.39
Table 9. Simulated Income Mobility
a. Ten Year Transition Matrix - ESI - Random Walk
Quintile in t+10
b.Ten Year Transition Matrix - ESI - AR(1)
Quintile in t+10ESI Scaled ESI ESI Scaled ESI
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Random walk AR(1)Figure 8. Income Mobility and Lifetime Persistence
Lowest Quintile
0.18
0.23
0.28
0.33
0.38
0.43
0.48
0.53
0.58
2
7
2
9
3
1
3
3
3
5
3
7
3
9
4
1
4
3
4
5
4
7
4
9
5
1
5
3
5
5
5
7
5
9
Random walk AR(1)